Conference proceeding
The Carrot or the Stick: Water Allocation Strategies for Uzbekistan
S
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association>2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington
2012
Abstract
Irrigation water is a constrained common-pool resource in Uzbekistan that leads to an increasing competition over its allocation among farmers. We examine how the management of the commons in this region affects individual strategic behavior. We conduct an experiment with farmers from Uzbekistan in which two policies are analyzed, a penalty and a bonus. The paper
studies a non-cooperative game and identifies the efficient use of water for irrigation. We compare our theoretical results with the experimental observations. Our findings suggest that the penalty and bonus mechanisms are effective in reducing individual water appropriation compared to the benchmark case in which these mechanisms are absent. Finally, we identify two
different effects that drive subjects’ opportunistic behavior.
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Details
- Title
- The Carrot or the Stick: Water Allocation Strategies for Uzbekistan
- Creators
- Andrey ZaikinAna Espinola-Arredondo
- Conference
- Agricultural and Applied Economics Association>2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Series
- S
- Identifiers
- 99900971133701842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Conference proceeding