Dissertation
Pollution Abatement R&D Investment Under Different Market Structures and Regulatory Regimes
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Washington State University
01/2017
Handle:
https://hdl.handle.net/2376/12881
Abstract
In this dissertation, I explore how the incentives for firms to invest in green technology are affected by changes in market structure and regulation. In the first chapter, I use an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether or not to invest in green technology where an entrant can benefit from a technology spillover. I identify cases where entry is blockaded, the incumbent will under-invest in the technology to deter entry, and when the incumbent will accommodate entry.
In the second chapter, I analyze a duopoly market with investment in green technology under two types of environmental regulation: a uniform fee where both firms face the same fee, and a type-dependent fee that is based on the firm's emissions. Firms can differ in their cost of investing in the technology. I find that social welfare is unambiguously higher under the type-dependent regime.
In the third chapter, I use a two-stage game of a duopoly decided to adopt a green technology under emission fees, quotas, and a tradeable permit scheme. I find that firm and regulator incentives are misaligned as firms achieve higher profits under a quota, but social welfare is higher under a fee.
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Details
- Title
- Pollution Abatement R&D Investment Under Different Market Structures and Regulatory Regimes
- Creators
- John Cahill Strandholm
- Contributors
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo (Advisor)Jill McCluskey (Committee Member)Felix Munoz-Garcia (Committee Member)
- Awarding Institution
- Washington State University
- Academic Unit
- School of Economic Sciences
- Theses and Dissertations
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Washington State University
- Number of pages
- 120
- Identifiers
- 99900581825801842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Dissertation