Disruption: an interrogation of the foundations of ethical systems

Daniel Mistak

Construction of a system of ethics can be plagued by problems that delegitimize the entire system. Emmanuel Levinas criticized both consequentialism and deontology for the ontological foundations of their systems, which both fail to engage the other as an other. Consequentialism considers the balance of happiness and unhappiness without concern for individuals. Deontology's adherents are subject to the moral law rather than the other. Levinas's ethics requires an orientation towards others that exemplifies the infinite responsibility between the subject and the other. In responding to the other, the subject gains his subjectivity. This differs from traditional philosophy, which posits an autonomous "I" and then relates to others from that position. Only with a view of this ethical relationship as the foundation of understanding can an ethical system be created ethically. Levinas's fundamental relationship provides a means to reexamine the decisions of legal systems in edition to ethical systems. By examining the foundations of tort law, it becomes evident how Levinas's language of responsibility and due care can provide a robust understanding to ground the tort of negligence although it does not provide the necessary legal groundings. Levinas demonstrates how the responsibility illuminated by the encounter with the other can provide a reason to legislate a certain decision: to legislate is to decide in response to a particular other. Case law provides the means to address and examine later cases while still referencing our fundamental relation to the other. Each case, considered in its similarity or dissimilarity to precedent presents a judge with the responsibility to decide a particular case before the bench. The jurist's reflections allow for moments where Levinas's ethics can be considered in deciding the case. In these instances, the just jurist's reflection on the responsibility to the other allows policy to be created that does not legislate Levinas, but rather provides a means for Levinas's voice to be heard in future common law interpretations. The space between ethical intuition and law provides this area for interpretation. Levinasian ethics cannot be established as law because its role is an anarchic one that calls the created system into question.

Disruption: an interrogation of the foundations of ethical systems

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