Journal article
Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
Economics letters, Vol.121(3), pp.463-467
12/01/2013
Abstract
We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Details
- Title
- Asymmetric information may protect the commons
- Creators
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo - Washington State UniversityFelix Munoz-Garcia - Washington State University
- Publication Details
- Economics letters, Vol.121(3), pp.463-467
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Number of pages
- 5
- Identifiers
- 99900971339001842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article