Journal article
Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court
International studies quarterly, Vol.56(1), pp.131-147
03/01/2012
Handle:
https://hdl.handle.net/2376/110644
Abstract
This article explores why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Compared with other international institutions, the ICC has substantial authority and autonomy. Since governments traditionally guard their sovereignty carefully, it is puzzling that the ICC was not only established, but established so rapidly. Looking beyond traditional explanations for joining international institutions, this study identifies a new causal factor: a country's dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values. This study captures different dimensions of what states value through trade relations, security alliances, and shared memberships in international organizations. Using event history analysis on monthly data from 1998 to 2004, we find that dependence networks strongly affect whether and when a state signs and ratifies the ICC. Some types of ratification costs also influence state commitment, but many conventional explanations of state commitment receive little empirical support.
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Details
- Title
- Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court
- Creators
- Jay GoodliffeDarren HawkinsChristine HorneDaniel L. Nielson
- Publication Details
- International studies quarterly, Vol.56(1), pp.131-147
- Academic Unit
- Sociology, Department of
- Publisher
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc
- Identifiers
- 99900547308801842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article