Journal article
Free-Riding and Cooperation in Environmental Games
Journal of public economic theory, Vol.11(1), pp.119-158
Received August 15, 2007; Accepted October 14, 2008.
02/2009
Abstract
This paper examines the negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which different countries determine the (nonenforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in the agreement. Furthermore , it analyzes countries' optimal investment in emission-reducing technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that a country perceives from an improved environmental quality, it is also concerned about the relative fulfillment of the terms specified in the international agreement either by itself or by others. I show, first, why countries may prefer to shift most promises of investment in clean technologies to other countries, despite the fact that these promises are usually nonenforceable by any international organization. Second, I determine countries' optimal investments in these technologies, and analyze how their particular investments depend on how demanding the international agreement is, and on the importance that countries assign to each others' relative fulfillment of their part of the treaty.
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Details
- Title
- Free-Riding and Cooperation in Environmental Games
- Creators
- ANA ESPINOLA-ARREDONDO - Washington State University
- Publication Details
- Journal of public economic theory, Vol.11(1), pp.119-158
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Blackwell Publishing Inc
- Edition
- Received August 15, 2007; Accepted October 14, 2008.
- Number of pages
- 40
- Identifiers
- 99900971133201842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article