Journal article
Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties
Journal of theoretical politics, Vol.23(1), pp.111-134
01/2011
Handle:
https://hdl.handle.net/2376/108087
Abstract
This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.
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Details
- Title
- Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties
- Creators
- Ana Espínola-Arredondo - School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, USAFélix Muñoz-García - School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, USA
- Publication Details
- Journal of theoretical politics, Vol.23(1), pp.111-134
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications; London, England
- Identifiers
- 99900547712301842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article