Journal article
Interest group incentives for post-lottery trade restrictions
Journal of regulatory economics, Vol.45(3), pp.281-304
06/2014
Handle:
https://hdl.handle.net/2376/109409
Abstract
The rights to use publicly-managed natural resources are sometimes distributed by lottery, and typically these rights are nontransferable. Prohibition of post-lottery permit transfers discourages applicants from entering the lottery solely for profitable permit sale, so only those who personally value the use of the resource apply. However, because permits are distributed randomly and trade is restricted, permits may not be used by those who value them most. We argue that restrictions on permit transfers is a policy response designed to limit entry when interest group membership is not distinguishable ex ante, and characterize the economic/informational conditions under which post-lottery prohibitions on trade are likely to arise. We develop our model using the specific case of the Four Rivers Lottery used to allocate rafting permits on four river sections in Idaho.
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Details
- Title
- Interest group incentives for post-lottery trade restrictions
- Creators
- Adrienne Ohler - Illinois State University Normal IL USAHayley Chouinard - Washington State University Pullman WA USAJonathan Yoder - Washington State University Pullman WA USA
- Publication Details
- Journal of regulatory economics, Vol.45(3), pp.281-304
- Academic Unit
- Water Research Center
- Publisher
- Springer US; Boston
- Identifiers
- 99900547038101842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article