Journal article
Investment in Green Technology and Entry Deterrence
The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Vol.20(2), pp.1-18
04/01/2020
Abstract
This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent's entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.
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Details
- Title
- Investment in Green Technology and Entry Deterrence
- Creators
- John C. Strandholm - University of South Carolina UpstateAna Espinola-Arredondo - Washington State University
- Publication Details
- The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Vol.20(2), pp.1-18
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Walter De Gruyter
- Number of pages
- 18
- Identifiers
- 99900971340401842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article