Journal article
The Entry-Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation
The Canadian journal of economics, Vol.47(1), pp.298-324
02/2014
Abstract
This paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm's concealment of information from potential entrants, thus deterring entry, and yet entail welfare improvements. Furthermore, we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change (inflexible regimes) than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time.
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Details
- Title
- The Entry-Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation
- Creators
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo - Washington State UniversityFelix Munoz-Garcia - Washington State UniversityJude Bayham - Washington State University
- Publication Details
- The Canadian journal of economics, Vol.47(1), pp.298-324
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Number of pages
- 27
- Identifiers
- 99900971133801842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article