Journal article
The Spillover Effects of Good Governance in a Tax Competition Framework with a Negative Environmental Externality
Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol.67(4), pp.701-724
08/2017
Handle:
https://hdl.handle.net/2376/115866
Abstract
We investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers, business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource. When consumers have more influence than resource owners, the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages, lobbying contribution, and the capital tax rate fall. This response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare. Capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners. Resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off.
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Details
- Title
- The Spillover Effects of Good Governance in a Tax Competition Framework with a Negative Environmental Externality
- Creators
- Raymond Batina - School of Economic Sciences Washington State University Pullman WA 99164 USAGregmar Galinato - School of Economic Sciences Washington State University Pullman WA 99164 USA
- Publication Details
- Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol.67(4), pp.701-724
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands; Dordrecht
- Identifiers
- 99900548016901842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article