Journal article
Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? : Environmental regulation and entry deterrence
Environment and development economics, Vol.20(2), pp.141-160
04/01/2015
Abstract
This paper investigates the design of environmental regulation under different regimes: flexible and inflexible policies. We analyze under which settings strict emission fees can be used as an entry-deterring tool, and become socially optimal. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and the incumbent firm are aligned regarding policy regimes ifentry can be easily deterred by setting a stringent regulation. Their incentives, however, can bemisaligned when entry becomes more costly to deter, leading the incumbent to actually preferenvironmental policies that attract entry.
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Details
- Title
- Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies?
- Creators
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo - Washington State UniversityFelix Munoz-Garcia - Washington State University
- Publication Details
- Environment and development economics, Vol.20(2), pp.141-160
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Publisher
- Cambridge Univ Press
- Number of pages
- 20
- Identifiers
- 99900971338701842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Journal article