Working paper
Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies
01/17/2022
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7273/000004766
Abstract
This paper examines a common-pool resource where quotas and Önes are set by a regula- tor, an artisanal organization (cooperative), or both. We analyze the interaction between the policies of both regulatory agencies under a áexible policy regime, where quotas and Önes can be revised across periods, and under an ináexible policy regime, where they cannot. We show that ine¢ ciencies arise in the ináexible regime, but they are eliminated when the two agencies coexist. We then extend our model to a setting where regulator and artisanal organization have misaligned preferences, demonstrating that both agencies are still preferable when the stock regenerates rapidly, but a single agency is preferable otherwise.
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Details
- Title
- Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies
- Creators
- Juan Rosas-Munoz (Author)Ana Espinola-Arredondo (Author) - Washington State University, Economic Sciences, School ofFelix Munoz-Garcia (Author) - Washington State University, Economic Sciences, School of
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Identifiers
- 99900972240901842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Working paper