Working paper
Fungicide Resistance and Misinformation: A Game Theoretic Approach
09/03/2020
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7273/000004764
Abstract
Fungicide resistance developed by pathogens that grapes are susceptible to is problematic for the industry today. We provide further insight into the strategic behavior of grape growers when their choices of fungicide levels generate a negative intertemporal production externality in the form of fungicide resistance. We find that when growers encounter this type of externality, the noncooperative fungicide level is higher than the socially optimal level. We examine a compensation mechanism designed to ameliorate fungicide resistance and find that it induces the socially optimal level; however, mis-information about the severity of the fungicide resistance generates distortions. The results suggest that the information available to growers about fungicide resistance is essential for its mitigation with the proposed compensation mechanism. In particular, we find that if the misinformed grower considers fungicide resistance to be relatively mild, then it is preferable that the misinformed grower has the compensating role.
Metrics
2 File views/ downloads
11 Record Views
Details
- Title
- Fungicide Resistance and Misinformation: A Game Theoretic Approach
- Creators
- Chelsea A. Pardini (Author) - New York Law SchoolAna Espinola-Arredondo (Author) - Washington State University, Economic Sciences, School of
- Academic Unit
- Economic Sciences, School of
- Identifiers
- 99900972241201842
- Language
- English
- Resource Type
- Working paper